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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ?
AIDAN O'NEILL * 
JASON COPPEL *
1. INTRODUCTION
It is a difficult thing to 
extension of the legal 
Human rights are generally 
which courts should be seen
appear to be objecting to any 
protection of human rights, 
thought of as a "good thing" 
to be safeguarding.
In this paper we shall review some recent decisions by 
and opinions delivered to the European Court of Justice 
in which the vocabulary of human or fundamental rights 
has been used. We confine ourselves to an analysis of 
texts produced by or delivered to the Court rather than 
attempt a survey of the academic literature on the topic 
of human rights protection because our interest is in the 
way the European Court has used, perhaps indeed 
manipulated, the vocabulary of human rights. We wish to 
provoke a debate. We question the easy assumption that 
the use of human rights rhetoric by the European Court of 
Justice means that the European Court is idealistically 




























































































Whilst it would appear to be widely accepted [1] that the 
initial motivation for the adoption of human rights 
rhetoric by the European Court of Justice was a desire to 
defend the Court's position on the supremacy of Community 
law over national law, close analysis of certain recent 
case law of the European Court shows that the Court has 
begun to use human rights language in a different way.
Human rights are now being used by the Court not, as 
previously, as a shield to protect long-standing claims 
about the status of Community law, but rather as a sword 
with which to extend its jurisdiction into areas 
previously reserved to Member States' Courts and to 
expand, incrementally, the influence of the Community 
over the activities of the Member States. We call this 
the "offensive” use of human rights, which is to be 
contrasted with the earlier "defensive” use.
It will be argued that the Court is using human rights 
"offensively” in two ways. On the one hand, it is 
extending the use of the concepts of human rights in 
specific areas of Community law previously untouched by 
those concepts. On the other hand, it is undertaking a 
more general expansion of its jurisdiction, in the guise 
of human rights protection, into areas previously the 
preserve of Member States, by means of subtle changes in 




























































































With respect to both the offensive and defensive uses of 
human rights we would question whether the Court has ever 
been motivated by a concern for any supposed lack of 
adequate protection of human rights within the European 
Communities. We contend that the increasing use of 
human rights rhetoric by the European Court has not, in 
fact, been matched by any equivalent increase in the 
actual protection accorded to the individual. We 
suggest that the Court has ulterior motives for employing 
human rights discourse. We argue that the European 
Court has used human rights discourse primarily with a 
view to maintaining and extending the supremacy of 
European Community law. We conclude that the Court 
treats human rights instrumentally for its own ends, that 
is, with a view to accelerating the process of legal 
integration in the Community. It has not protected 
fundamental human rights for their own sake. It has not 
taken these rights seriously.
2. THE DEFENSIVE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
From the late nineteen sixties onwards there was
increasing disquiet expressed by the Courts in Germany
and Italy on the question of whether or not the
fundamental rights entrenched in their nat ional
constitutions were recognised or protected within
European Community law [2], The fear was that the



























































































gradually be eroded as the competences of the Community 
increased.
In response to the threat that national Courts (notably 
those of Germany) would resolve their dilemma by opting 
for the supremacy of their own national constitutional 
provisions on fundamental rights protection (and hence 
take it upon themselves to measure the validity of 
European law measures against their own national 
constitutional requirements) the European Court appeared 
suddenly to discover that the protection of fundamental 
rights was a principle of European Community law. This 
development flew in the face of its own previous case law 
rejecting the idea of fundamental rights protected within 
the Community legal order [3], and was effected 
notwithstanding the absence of any mention or list of 
fundamental rights within the texts of the Community 
treaties.
In a series of cases, primarily in response to references 
from German Courts, the European Court began to use the 
vocabulary of fundamental rights protection.
The European Court first proclaimed the new doctrine of 
fundamental rights protection in passing in Staudar v. 
Dim [4] . Referring to a decision by the Commission to 
allow butter to be purchased at low cost by, inter alios, 
senior citizens on proof of their status, the Court 




























































































general principles of Community law and protected by the 
Court". This reference to "fundamental rights" was 
expanded upon by the Court • in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft [5] to the effect that "respect for 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of law protected by the Court of Justice." 
And in Nold (II) v . Commission [6] the Court held that, 
in addition to Member States' constitutions, 
international Conventions could also supply guide-lines 
which could be taken into consideration by the Court on 
matters concerning claims to "fundamental rights".
Subsequent case law [7] has indicated that these 
international Conventions taken into account by the Court 
include the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European 
Social Charter and a number of conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation.
It is the European Convention on Human Rights, which has 
been ratified by all the Member States of the Community, 
which has become the most important of these 
international documents in terms of being a source text 
for the Court in developing the idea of f undarr.ental 
rights. The European Convention on Human Rights was 
first specifically referred to by the Court in the 1975 
case of Rutili [8] and has since been quoted by the Court 
on numerous occasions [9]. From these references it 




























































































unwritten Community law which, it claims, justifies 
protection of fundamental rights includes principles 
which are identical to the terms of the European 
Convention.
The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms was expressly mentioned in the 
1987 preamble to the Single European Act [10] as one of 
the sources of the fundamental rights recognised by the 
Community. This reference was quickly interpreted by 
the Court as a tacit approval by the Member States of the 
European Court's adoption of the terms of the Convention
[11]. Formal recognition in a Treaty article of the 
status of the European Convention as a source of 
fundamental rights to be protected by the Community was 
given in article F (2) of the Common Provisions of the 
Treaty on European Political Union agreed upon at the 
Maastricht Summit of December 1991. This article states 
the following:
"The (European] Union shall respect fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the 





























































































It is by now beyond question that the early use of human 
rights discourse seen from Stauder onward was primarily 
defensive of the matter of the supremacy of Community 
law. As Professor Joseph Weiler has stated, on a number 
of occasions, [12] :
"The surface language of the Court in Stauder 
and its progeny is the language of human 
fights. The deep structure all about supremacy 
... [It wasl an attempt to protect the concept 
of supremacy threatened because of the apparent 
(largely theoretical) inadequate protection of 
human rights in the original treaty systems."
Subsequent case law has shown that this particular 
strategy to defend the supremacy of Community law and of 
the European Court has been a largely successful one, 
despite initial caution on the part of the German Courts. 
In its judgement of 4 April 1987 in Wuenache 
Handelagesellschaft [13] the German Federal 
Constitutional Court stated
"(S]o long as the European Communities, and in 
particular in the case of the European Court, 
generally insure an effective protection of 
fundamental rights as against the sovereign 
power of the Communities which is to be 
regarded as substantially similar to the 
protection of fundamental rights required 
unconditionally by the [German] Constitution, 



























































































essential content of fundamental rights, the 
Federal Constitutional Court will no longer 
exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the 
applicability of secondary Community
legislation ... and it will no longer review 
such legislation by the standard of the 
fundamental rights contained in the [German) 
Constitution.”
The German acceptance of the human rights credentials of 
the European Communities is, in other words, conditional 
on the European Court's protection of human rights being 
maintained to as high a standard as that of the German 
Courts.
It should also be noted that, in its judgement number 232 
of 21 April 1989, the Italian Constitutional Court re­
affirmed the principle, first set out by that Court in 
1973 in Frontlnl v. Mlnistero dalle Finanze [14], that 
the Italian Constitutional Court retains a residuary 
power to declare a Community norm invalid if the 
Community norm in question appears to be contrary to 
fundamental principles of the Italian constitutional 
legal order or to compromise inalienable human rights. 
The Italian Constitutional Court thereby maintains its 
own competence to ensure that the essential values of its 
national legal order are protected vis a vis Community 
norms and, in effect, to review judgements of the Court 




























































































However, both the German and Italian reservations on the 
matter of human rights are, and are likely to remain, 
theoretical. Neither Court has refused to apply
Community laws on the basis of their violation of 
fundamental rights. Professor Schermers analyses the 
reservations as being no more than a general assertion of 
the existence of a higher normative order of peremptory 
norms in international law which ensures that even the 
E.C. treaty cannot legally be applied in a way which 
violates fundamental human rights. [16]
It is interesting to note that the text of article F (2) 
of the Common Provisions of the Maastricht Treaty does 
not answer the reservations expressed by both the Italian 
and German courts on the matter of the protection of 
inalienable human rights. The article simply takes up 
the formula created by the jurisprudence of the European 
Court to the effect that fundamental rights will be 
treated in the same way as if they were general 
principles of Community law. The article does not
commit the European Onion to treating human rights as 
some higher normative standard against whioch Community 
law is to be measured.
In summary, we may justifiably conclude that the European 
Court's policy on human rights appears, thus far, to have 




























































































States to the integrity, unity and supremacy of the 
Community legal order.
3. THE OFFENSIVE USE OF HOMAN RIGHTS
In an address delivered to the Centre for European 
Studies at Harvard University in November 1989 Judge 
Mancini of the European Court summarised and assessed the 
position which had by then been achieved by the Court on 
human rights:
"Reading an unwritten bill of rights into 
Community law is indeed the most striking 
contribution the Court made to the development 
of a constitution for Europe. This statement 
should be qualified in two respects. First ... 
that contribution was forced on t he Court form 
outside, by the German and, later, the Italian 
Constitutional Courts. Second, the Court's 
effort to safeguard the fundamental rights of 
the Community citizens stopped at the threshold 
of national legislations." [17]
Recent case law has shown that this assessment has to be 
modified however to reflect a change in the strategy of 
the European Court in relation to human rights rhetoric: 
from being a defensive tool in relation to the supremacy 
issue, it now appears to have been turned to offensive 



























































































which broaden the .scope and impact of Community Law at
the expense of Member State law, in areas where
previously Member States had thought themsel ves to
possess an independent discretion.
3.1 Specific Expansion of the Use of Human Rights
As Judge Mancini indicates in the above passage one 
feature of what we have characterised as the defensive 
use of human rights developed by the European Court was 
that the concept of human rights was applied only to 
Community acts. Initially, at least, human rights were 
not applied directly to the activities of Member States 
118].
More recent case law seems to suggest 
longer feels itself constrained 
distinction between Community acts and 
at least in relation to human rights, 
increasingly been applying human rights 
the acts of Member States.
that the Court no 
to observe any 
Member State acts, 








decided in 1975 appeared to lay the foundations 
later development: Rutili [19]. The facts of 
were as follows: the French Ministry of the
sought to restrict the movements of an Italian 
within France, derogating from Article 48 of the 
ty on the free movement of workers. The grounds




























































































48(3) namely "public policy, public security and public 
health". The European Court examined the question as to 
whether or not this public policy derogation from the 
Treaty was justifiable under Community law. The Court 
held that the scope of the public policy derogations 
could not be determined unilaterally by Member States, 
but was a matter to be determined by Community 
institutions.
The Court held that any such national derogations from 
Community law had to be interpreted strictly in the light 
of Community law generally. Among the relevant 
provisions of Community law was a Directive 64/221 on
Special_Measures Concerning the Free Movement of Foreign
Workers and Regulations 1612/68 on Trade Union 
Membership. This directive and the regulations placed 
limits on the capacity of Member States to derogate from 
the principle of the free movement of workers on grounds 
of public policy. The French derogation on public 
policy grounds was accordingly assessed in the light of 
these limitations.
However, the Court went on to suggest that these 
limitations on Member State action under positive 
Community law were also parallelled by certain provisions 
of the European Convention on Hunan Rights [20] .
"ITlhese limitations ... are a specific 
manifestation of the more general principle 



























































































Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms ... which provides(s), 
in identical terms that no restrictions in the 
interests of national security or public safety 
shall be placed on the rights secured by the 
above quoted articles other than such as are 
necessary for the protection of those interests 
'in a democratic society'".
The Court alluded to human rights considerations in the 
context of Member State action. It did not, however, 
apply them directly, or indeed hold them applicable, to 
that Member State action . The allusion to human rights 
is made simply to justify and reinforce the Court's 
interpretation of the Community instruments.
As Advocate-General Trabucchi stated in his opinion 
Watson and Belmann [21], a case decided in the year after 
Rutlli:
''[S]ome learned writers have felt justified in 
concluding that the provisions of the 
[European] Convention must be treated as 
forming an integral part of the Community legal 
order, whereas it seems clear to me that the 
spirit of the judgement [in Rutili] did not 
involve any substantive reference to the 
provisions [of the European Convention] 
themselves but merely a reference to the 




























































































rules with which the judgement drew an analogy, 
they are a specific expression."
In the Advocate-General's opinion, the novelty of 
Rutlli1s reference to human rights lay rather in the 
context in which that reference was made, namely in 
relation to a discretionary act of a Member State which 
restricted a Community economic freedom.
In Watson v . Belmann itself there was argument to the 
effect that human rights consideration were relevant to 
considering the validity of certain Italian regulations 
relating to the compulsory registration of foreign 
nationals staying in Italy. Advocate-General Trabucchi 
asserted [22] that the European Court might look at the 
alleged infringement of a fundamental right by a Member 
State body at least to the extent to which that 
infringement impacted also on economic rights protected 
by Community law. The Court, however, did not take up 
the human rights points and decided the case on other 
grounds.
It is not until 1989 that the Court is seen openly to 
take the step of assessing the validity of an act of a 
Member State on the basis of human rights considerations. 
In Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany [23] the
plaintiff was the lessee of a farm which, during the 
period of his lease, he had developed as a dairy farm to 




























































































quota. These quotas are attached to the land unt i 1
surrender of the quota. Accordi ng to the German
authorities, the relationship of the quota to the land 
was such that when the plaintiff's lease expired, he was 
unable to surrender his quota and claim compensation 
without the consent of the lessor, the owner of the land. 
This consent was withheld and Herr Wachauf was faced with 
the situation of being deprived, without compensation, of 
the fruits of his labour.
It was posited, inter alia, that such an eventuality 
would be incompatible with the requirements of the 
protection of fundamental rights, (although this phrase 
appears nowhere except in the judgement of the Court),, 
being potentially an "unconstitutional expropriation 
without compensation" [24].
The Court held [25]
"[l]t must be observed that Community rules 
which, upon the expiry of the lease, had the 
effect of depriving the lessee, without 
compensation, of the fruits of his labour and 
of his investments in the tenanted holding 
would be incompatible with the requirements of 
the protection of fundamental rights in the 
Community legal order. Since those 
requirements are also binding on the Member 
States when they implement Community rules, the 




























































































thosa rules in accordance with those 
requirements."
Nevertheless, in that case, the pleas with respect to 
fundamental rights did not cause the Court to hold the 
Community legislation to be invalid. As in Stauder the 
Court held [26] that the regulation in question was 
expressed in broad enough terms as to allow for 
compensation to be granted to the aggrieved tenant 
farmer, thereby allowing his fundamental rights to be 
respected.
However, the decision in Wachauf breaks new ground 
because, for the first time, the European Court was 
willing to apply human rights principles to national acts 
formulated in implementation of Community legislation. 
The Court held that where a Community provision 
incorporates the protection of a human right national 
measures which implement that provision must give effect 
to the provision in such a way that the human right is 
respected.
This decision, in effect, rendered the original 
determination of the German authorities invalid on human 
rights grounds. The German authorities were instructed 
to look again at the primary Community legislation in the 





























































































This may indeed be a conservative interpretation of the 
implications of Wachauf. The European Court itself, in 
the subsequent case of Elleniki Radiophonia Tileoraai v. 
Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis [27], interpreted Wachauf 
in much broader terms. The Court restated its decision 
in Wachauf in these terms [28]:
"(M]easures which are incompatible with respect 
for human rights, which are recognised and 
guaranteed [in Community law), could not be 
admitted in the Community."
It is not clear from the terms of the judgement in 
Elleniki whether the Court in this passage is referring 
to Community measures or Member State measures, but given 
that Elleniki concerned measures instituted by Greece, a 
Member State, in derogation from Community law, the 
latter conclusion is not unjustifiable.
Further, in Elleniki the Court adopted a more aggressive 
human rights approach to the question of the 
admissibility of public policy derogations by Member 
States from Community law than is evidenced by Rut111■ 
Elleniki concerned a challenge by an independent 
broadcasting company in Greece to the enforcement of a 
State monopoly on the provision of television services 
within Greece. Greek law forbade any party other than 
the State Television Company to broadcast television 
programmes within Greek territory. The defendant




























































































their defence that the television monopoly was contrary 
both to Community law (inter alia, on the free movement 
of goods and services) and to Article 10 of the European 
Convention on freedom of expression and information. 
The Greek Government defended the television monopoly as 
a public policy derogation from the free movement of 
goods and services under Article 66. The Court held 
[29] that:
"When a Member State invokes articles 56 
and 66 of the Treaty in order to justify 
rules which hinder the free movement of 
services, this justification, which is 
provided for in Community law, must be 
interpreted in the light of general 
principles of law, notably fundamental 
rights. The- national rules in question 
may only benefit from the article'56 and 66 
exceptions insofar as they are compatible 
with fundamental rights, the observance of 
which the Court ensures."
The Court went on [30] :
"The limitations imposed on the power of Member 
States to apply the provisions of articles 66 
and 56 of the treaty for reasons of public 
order, public security and public health must 
be understood in the light of the general 
principle of freedom of expression, enshrined 



























































































In Elleniki, the European Court is once more seen to
be extending its jurisdiction in the matter of human 
rights. The Court is, in effect, applying the text 
of the European Convention not only to the acts of 
Community institutions but also to any attempts by 
Member States to derogate from the market freedoms 
assured by Community law. It is a development of
Rutili precisely in that it uses the European 
Convention on Human Rights as an additional standard 
on the basis of which to judge Member State action, 
rather than, as in Rutili, merely a declaration which 
happens to echo general principles of existing 
Community law.
Joseph Weiler, writing before the Elleniki decision 
[31] suggests that the following statement of 
principle could be derived from the judgement in 
Rutili:
"If the Community law is but a specific 
manifestation of a general principle it 
should follow that the general principle 
forms part of the Community regime which 
controls the practices of the Member States 
under the derogation. It further follows, 
that a national practice which violated 
this general principle without violation a 
specific rule of the Community regime, 



























































































of the principle supremacy, be
inapplicable.
o f
We would argue that Weiler goes too far in drawing 
this conclusion from Rutili, but would accept this 
formulation as an accurate statement of Community law 
following Ellenikl.
Most recently, Tha Society_for the Protection of
Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Stephen Grogan and 
other» [32] represents the encroachment by Community 
Law on one of the fundamental precepts of the Irish 
Constitution, raising the possibility that the Irish 
guarantee of the right to life of the unborn child, 
and the consequent prohibition on abortion in the 
Irish Republic might be held to be incompatible with 
fundamental objectives of the Community. This case 
will be discussed in full below. It is sufficient 
to note at this stage that the jurisdictional 
expansion in this instance was not achieved through 
upholding the pre-eminence of individual human 
rights. Rather, the Court treated the claim to
human rights as concerning a restriction on the 
Community freedom to provide and receive services. 
In so doing the Court effectively ignored the clear 
wording of the Irish Constitution which explicitly 



























































































3.2 Changing formulations of Jurisdictional Rules
The line of cases from Wachauf through to S.P.U,.C.
also evinces an incremental expansion of the area of
law and of Member State action which is subject to
human rights validation by the European Court of
Justice.
In Cinéthèque and others v. Fédération national» dea 
Cinemas français [33] the Court stated
"Although it is true that it is the duty of this 
Court to ensure observance of fundamental rights 
in the field of Community law, it has no power 
to examine the compatibility with the European 
Convention of national legislation which 
concerns, as in this case, an area which falls 
within the jurisdiction of the national 
legislator.”
Judge Pescatore, commenting on the Cinéthèque 
decision, wrote as follows: [34]
"This position shows that the Court is 
conscious of the limits of its 
jurisdiction: called upon to guarantee
respect for the law within the Community it 
has no mission to busy itself with the 




























































































of the legislative sovereignty of Member 
States."
Nevertheless, the Cin6th6qua formula was reworded in 
Demlral v. Stadt Schwaebisch Ground [35]
"[the Court] has no power to examine the
compatibility with the European Convention on Human 
Rights of national legislation lying outside the
scope of Community law".
This change of emphasis from that which is within the 
jurisdiction of the national legislator to that which 
is within the jurisdiction of Community law is a 
subtle one, but one which may nevertheless have
revolutionised the impact of human rights
considerations on national administrative and
legislative action. For one thing it paved the way 
for the decision in Wachauf. As has been outlined 
above, this case applied human rights standards to a 
Member State act in implementation of a Community
rule. Such an act is one which clearly falls within 
the jurisdiction of the national legislator and also 
falls within the scope of Community law. The
application of human rights criteria in this case 
would not have been consistent with the reasoning of 
Cln6th6que but fell within the Demirel formulation.
In Elleniki, the Court appeared to go further,




























































































"According to its jurisprudence ... [see 
the decisions in Cin6th6que and Damiral1 
the Court cannot assess, from the point of 
view of the European Convention on Human 
Rights national legislation which is not 
situated within the body of Community law. 
By contrast, as soon as any such 
legislation enters the field of application 
of Community law, the Court, as the sole 
arbiter in this matter, must provide the 
national Court with all the elements of 
interpretation which are necessary in order 
to enable it to assess the compatibility of 
that legislation with the fundamental 
rights - as laid down in particular in the 
European Convention on Human Rights - the 
observance of which the Court ensures."
The implication of the Court is that it would examine 
all matters which did fall within the area of 
Community law. The only Member State actions which 
the Court might decline to vet on human rights 
grounds are, therefore, those which occur in an area 
of exclusive Member State jurisdiction. This 
concept of exclusive Member State jurisdiction may 



























































































This implication was made explicit by Advocate 
General Van Gerven in S.P.U.C. v. Grogan when he 
stated [37] :
"In [Cln6th&qual ... it was stated that the 
Court's power of review did not extend to "an 
area which falls within the jurisdiction of the 
national legislator", a statement which, 
generally speaking, is true. Yet once a
national rule is involved which has effects in 
an area covered by Community law (in this case 
Article 59 of the EEC Treaty) and which, in 
order to be permissible, must be able to be 
justified under Community law with the help of 
concepts or principles of Community law, then 
the appraisal of that national rule no longer 
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
national legislature."
The Court in S.P.U.C. v. Grogan did not expressly 
adopt the Advocate-General's formulation, asserting
[38] that it was competent to pronounce on human 
rights issues "where national legislation falls 
within the field of application of Community law" but 
that "the Court has no such jurisdiction with regard 
to national legislation lying outside the scope of 
Community law." Nevertheless, the implication as to 





























































































In summary, the Court's power of review arguably now 
extends to any Member State action in an area where 
the Member State does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction. In practice, this would be a major 
expansion of the Cin6th6que reasoning, and a doctrine 
of much wider application than the strict terms of 
the decision in Wachauf.
4. IS THE EUROPEAN COURT TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ?
The adoption of the discourse of human rights seemed to 
commit the European Court to the principle that certain 
Community rules of law should be measured by the standard 
of their respect for human rights. If the rules in 
question failed to respect particular fundamental rights 
then this would of itself be a ground for declaring them 
invalid. A question then arises as to the competence of 
the European Court to subject even primary articles of 
the Treaty which created it to scrutiny on human rights 
grounds. As Manfred Dauses states [39] in reference to 
human rights
"Strong arguments point to the conclusion 
that elemental legal principles which are 
based on the ultimate concept of law itself 
and which therefore constitute the 
fundamental pillars of any society take 
precedence even over the Community 




























































































inconsistent with their nature as an 
ethico-juridical guarantee of a 
fundamental, prepositive and supra-positive 
type if positive law of whatever type were 
to be given priority. In fact in relation 
to international law that is precisely the 
conclusion which has been expressed in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Articles 53 and 64 of which declare that 
any treaty is void if it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international 
law (ius cogens)."
Dauses would appear to be arguing that human rights are
at the peak of the normative hierarchy of laws against
which all rules of positive Community law, even Treaty
provisions, may be measured and if found wanting,
declared invalid.
This is, in essence, the basis of the European Court's 
claim to national Courts that it could be relied upon to 
protect fundamental rights, which was implicit in the 
Court's original adoption of human rights discourse. 
National Courts would only accept the supremacy of 
European law if they were persuaded that the European 
Court was truly a guardian of the rights of the 
individual against the possible abuse of legal forms by 
the institutions of the Community. Legitimate action by 




























































































standard of respect for fundamental human rights. As 
the Court stated in Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [40]
"(M)easures which are incompatible with the 
fundamental rights recognised by the 
Constitutions of [the Member] States are 
unacceptable in the Community."
However, in the above cases and indeed in most if not 
all of the cases in which the Court has adopted human 
rights discourse it is the Community rule, or the 
Community objective which has prevailed, on the 
facts, over the violation of human rights arguments.
A recent survey of human rights protection in the 
European Community admitted [41]:
"[A]lthough the Court has increasingly 
referred to the [European] Convention, the 
European Social Charter, international 
treaties and constitutional principles and 
traditions, the rights contained therein 
have hardly been developed by the Court, 
and they have rarely been relied on to give 
concrete protection to an individual."
It is our contention that these common outcomes are 
not coincidental, but, as evidenced in particular in 
the recent cases discussed above, they follow 
directly from an instrumental manipulation of the 
nature and importance of the concept of human rights 



























































































fundamental economic freedoms enshrined in the Treaty 
of Rome, and other Community objectives such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy.
In each case the Court has manipulated the usage of 
human rights principles, endowing the principles with 
just enough significance in Community terms to allow 
the triumph of the Community will, be that in terms 
of the actual concrete outcome of the case or merely 
in terms of obiter expansions of claimed Community 
competence, laid down to be taken up and expanded 
upon in future cases.
4.1. Wachauf -_human rights as an__ interpretative
principle
In Wachauf, for example, human rights, far from being 
regarded as a universal and overarching principle of 
validation, were treated as no more than a principle of 
interpretation which Member States should adopt when 
applying Community legislation. Firstly, the Court firmly 
placed its regard for fundamental rights in a position 
effectively subordinate to its regard for the common 
(Community) good. It stated that [42] :
"The fundamental rights recognized by the Court 
are not absolute, however, but must be
considered in relation to their social
function. Consequently, restrictions may be 



























































































particular in the context of a common
organization of a market, provided that those
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives
of general interest pursued by the Community
and do not constitute, with regard to the aim 
pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference impairing the very substance of 
those rights. "
In effect then, a fundamental right may only be 
recognised and protected insofar as it is consistent with 
Community objectives. Even the outer limit of human 
rights abuse, the provision that the very substance of 
the right must not be impaired, is itself to be 
delineated according to the (Community) aim pursued.
The Court in Wachauf goes on to state, as we have noted 
above:
" IS]ince...(the requirements of the protection 
of fundamental rights) . . . are also binding on 
the Member States when they implement Community 
rules, the Member States must, as far as 
possible, apply those rules in accordance with 
those requirements." [43]
Not only may the Community rules discount human rights in 
the name of common objectives, but the Member States, in 
applying those Community rules, need have regard to human 




























































































and only to the extent that this is compatible with the 
wording of the legislation. To summarise, where 
Community actions, in pursuit of Community objectives, 
are concerned, human rights claims are quite clearly not 
accorded fundamental status.
4.2. Elleniki - human rights used to validate national 
action
A different approach from Wachauf is apparent in relation 
to purely Member States' actions which are not in 
implementation of Community law. The issue arises 
clearly when a Member State seeks to invoke its rights 
under the Treaties to derogate from a provision relating 
to the Community economic freedoms. In Ellaniki in 
which, as we have seen, the Greek Government sought to 
derogate from the general Community freedom to provide 
and receive services, the Court held that such 
derogations must not only be compatible with the general 
administrative principles of Community law (for example 
proportionality) but should also conform to the general 
standards of human rights which the Court claims to 
respect and protect.
Human rights are seen to reclaim their position at the 
peak of the normative hierarchy, and Member State 
actions, specifically those actions which detract from 
fundamental Community economic freedoms, must be subject 



























































































eminent position of human rights would seem to be in 
conflict with the approach of the Court in Wachauf, where 
human rights appeared to be treated as subordinate to 
Community objectives. The Court itself does not appear 
to see any contradiction between the decisions in Wachauf 
and Ellaniki since it quotes the former case in support 
of its argument in the latter. HOw then are Wachauf and 
Ellanilci to be reconciled? One may note immediately 
that whereas in Wachauf the Court was examining the 
validity of a Community provision, in Elleniki the matter 
at issue was a provision of national legislation. There 
would appear then to be two standards in operation - one 
standard for Community acts, another standard for Member 
States' acts. In the former, human rights are 
subordinate to and have to be interpreted in the light of 
Community objectives. In the latter, human rights are 
presented as an additional hurdle which national States' 
acts have to negotiate in order to be accepted as valid.
[44]
4.3. S.P.U.C. - human rights avoided
In 1983 following upon a referendum in the Irish 
Republic, an amendment (the eighth) was made to the Irish 
Constitution. The following subsection, article 
40(3) (iii), was introduced into it:
"(T]he State acknowledges the right to life of 
the unborn and with due regard to the equal 




























































































laws to respect and, as far as practicable by 
its laws to defend and vindicate that right."
In 1989 a case was brought by the Society for the
Protection of the Unborn Child against the office bearers 
of various Students Unions in Ireland seeking an
injunction to prevent the students from distributing 
various publications which contained, inter alia,
information about clinics which performed legal abortions 
in Great Britain [45] . The case was referred to the
European Court of Justice for a preliminary judgement 
under article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
The law, at the time of this reference was unclear as to 
whether or not the European Court would recognise and 
protect fundamental rights proclaimed in the constitution 
of only one Member State, or was willing to extend this 
protection only where the right was protected in some, a 
majority, or indeed all of the Member States. In 1976 
in I.R.C.A. [46] Advocate-General Warner had stated that, 
in his opinion that "a fundamental right recognised and 
protected by the Constitution of any Member State must be 
recognised and protected in Community law."
On the basis of this opinion, one commentator, writing as 
recently as 1988 [47] stated that:
”[I)t is probable that the European Court would 
accept as a general principle of Community law 




























































































in only one Member State. In other words, any 
measure which is contrary to human rights in 
Germany or any other Member State will be 
annulled by the European Court."
Such a view gains plausibility given the history of the 
European Court's relations with the German Courts on this 
matter and in the light of the thesis of the European 
Court's adoption of human rights protection as a defence 
of the supremacy of Community law.
The Irish Constitution's recognition and protection of 
the right to life of the unborn appears to be a clear 
case of a fundamental right which is protected in only 
one Member State of the Community. However, in S,P.0.C. 
v . Grogan neither the Advocate-General nor the Court 
followed the "maximalist" approach of I.R.C.A. on 
Community protection of human rights. In his opinion 
Advocate-General Van Gerven described the point at issue 
in the case in the following terms [48J:
"[T]wo rules which stem from fundamental rights 
come into conflict in this case: the freedom of 
the defendants in the main proceedings to 
distribute information, which I have accepted 
as being the corollary of the Community freedom 
to provide services vested in the actual 
providers of the service ... and the 
prohibition to assist pregnant women, by 




























































































Irish Supreme Court, results from the 
constitutional protection of unborn life."
The Irish Constitution's grant of a "fundamental right" 
to life is, in effect, placed by the Advocate-General at 
precisely the same level as the right freely to provide 
services throughout the Community. Protection of the 
former right demands a restriction on the distribution of 
information; while the stimulation of free trade appears 
to require freedom of information.
In its judgement [49] the European Court approaches the 
matter as if the Irish Constitution's proclamation of 
"the right to life of the unborn” were to be understood 
as nothing more than a restriction on abortion. The 
Court only uses the phrase "right to life of the unborn" 
in quoting the relevant provision of the Irish 
Constitution. Thereafter it glosses over arguments to 
the effect that abortion could not be granted the status 
of a service to be protected under Community law as it 
constituted an attack on fundamental rights guaranteed to 
the unborn in the Irish Constitution.
As Walsh J. of the Irish Supreme Court and former judge 
of the European Court of Human Rights had stated [50] in 
the Supreme Court in the appeal by S.P.U.C. against the 
refusal of the judge at first instance to grant an 




























































































"Although the provision of abortion within the 
law in particular Member States provides 
profit for those engaged in it, that could 
scarcely qualify it to be described as a 
service of economic significance of a type 
which must be available in all the Member 
States of the Communities especially when it 
is manifestly contrary not only to the public 
morality of the Member State in question and 
to the ordre public but also destructive of 
the most fundamental of all human rights, 
namely the right to life itself. The fact 
that particular activities, even grossly 
immoral ones, may be permitted to a greater or 
lesser extent in some Member-States does not 
mean that they are to be considered within the 
objectives of the treaties of the European 
Communities, particularly the Treaty of Rome , 
which is the Treaty of the European Economic 
Community. A fortiori, it cannot be one of 
the objectives of the European Communities 
that a Member State should be obliged to 
permit activities which are clearly designed 
to set at naught the constitutional guarantees 
for the protection within the State of a 
fundamental human right."
The European Court characterised these arguments, which 




























































































abortion ought to be protected as a service under
Community law, as moral rather than legal, and hence
arguments which did not raise justiciable issues. It
stated [51]:
"It is not for the Court to substitute its 
assessment for that of the legislature in 
those Member States where the activities in 
question are practised legally."
This refusal to look at the morality of Member States 
action sits uneasily with the previous jurisprudence of 
the Court, for example in Ellaniki, that they were 
willing to examine national legislation for its 
compatibility with fundamental rights.
Having translated the Irish fundamental right into what 
it regarded as suitably legal terms, namely as a 
restriction on the availability of abortion, the European 
Court then defined abortion or termination of pregnancy 
as "a medical activity which is normally provided for 
remuneration may be carried out as part of a professional 
activity" [52]. Accordingly abortion constituted "a
service within the meaning of Article 60 of the treaty." 
[53] . Article 59 of the Treaty prohibits any
restriction by Member States on the freedom to supply 
services throughout the Community. However, the
European Court held that the injunction which was sought
against the students did not constitute a breach of




























































































associations and the British abortion clinics was a 
"tenuous" one. The Court's formal finding on the matter 
is stated thus [54] :
"[I]t is not contrary to Community law for a 
Member State in which medical terminations of 
pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit students 
associations from distributing about the 
identity and location of clinics in another 
Member State where voluntary termination of 
pregnancy is lawfully carried out and the means 
of communicating with those clinics, where the 
clinics in question have no involvement in the 
distribution of the said information."
The terms of the judgement of the Court deciding against 
the students are surprisingly narrow. The judgement
leaves open the possibility of some forma 1 agency
relationship being set up between the British abort ion
clinics and activis ts in Ireland. This would allow the
latter, as associates of an economic operator established 
in another Member State, to receive the full protection 
of European law regarding freedom to provide and receive 
services as against the specific provisions of the Irish 
constitut ion.
It seems likely that this issue will therefore re-appear 
before the European Court of Justice, once the student 
associations have made formal agreements with the English




























































































already found that abortion is a service within the 
meaning of the Treaty, may seek to adopt the reasoning of 
Advocate-General Van Gerven to the effect that, whilst 
abortion is a service and thus entitled to protection 
under the Treaty, the Irish Government may derogate from 
the Treaty provisions:
"[T)hey are entitled to invoke the ground of 
public policy referred to in Article 56 read 
together with Article 66 (and also in Article 
36) of the EEC Treaty..., in other words, 
according to the definition which has been 
adopted by the Court, 'a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to the requirements 
of public policy affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society1 ". [55]
lie then goes on to examine this derogation in the light 
of fundamental rights and freedoms, as is now required by 
Ellanikl. In the light of the importance of the 
objective of the restriction on freedom of expression, as 
perceived by the Irish authorities, that is, "to 
effectuate the value judgement contained in the 
Constitution with regard to the need to protect unborn 
life" [56], the Advocate-General concluded that the 
restriction was acceptable.
Before Ellaniki it may well have been possible to claim a 
public policy derogation from the Treaty provisions, but 




























































































rights validation the Irish Government may find itself 
in a corner should the European Court of Human Rights 
find that its constitutional amendment is contrary to the 
European Convention. The possibility of challenge to 
the very substance of the eighth amendment cannot 
therefore be ruled out.
The European Court's interpretation of the Irish 
provision on abortion has the effect of extending that 
Court's jurisdiction into the very heart of the Irish 
constitution. Henceforth, the onus is on the Irish
authorities to justify iui Community law their ejt facie 
interference with Community "fundamental rights". [57]
4.4. Heylens - tha alevatIon of Community Rights to th« 
»t»tua of fundamanta1 human Rights
Another technique used by the Court in relation to 
fundamental human rights has been a confusion of 
terminology which has resulted in the elevation of the 
free market freedoms guaranteed in the Community treaties 
to a status equivalent to that of fundamental human 
rights. In such cases as A .D ,B. H . U . [58] and Heylena 
[59], Community economic freedoms were grouped together 
with and referred to as "fundamental rights", hence 
destroying any possibility of the maintenance in practice 




























































































might be measured against human rights considerations. 
This appeared to have been the approach formerly espoused 
by the Court and is one which is borne out by the 
traditional international law conception of human rights 
as "higher law" as expressed by Dauses [60].
As a result, inter alia, of this confusion in terminology 
it is no longer clear that Community acts, in pursuit of 
Community objectives such as the four economic freedoms, 
fall to be considered against the overarching standard of 
human rights protection.
In A.D.B.H.U, . [61] it was stated that
"[I)t should be borne in mind that the 
principles of free movement of goods and 
freedom of competition, together with freedom 
of trade as a fundamental right, are general 
principles of Community law of which the Court 
ensures observance."
The Community economic freedom, the free movement of 
goods was placed on the same conceptual level as a 
"fundamental right". But, the Court was to go further.
In Heylena [62] it was stated
"Sine* free access to employment Is a
fundamental right which the treaty •confers 
individually on each worker of the Community,




























































































against any decision of a national authority 
refusing the benefit of that right is essential 
in order to secure for the individual effective 
protection for his right."
From the terms of the Heylens decision it appears that 
the four freedoms of workers, services, goods and capital 
enshrined in the Treaties are themselves capable of being 
translated into individuals' fundamental rights. It 
would seem, then, that there is no distinction and hence 
no hierarchical relationship being posited by the 
European Court between the basic human rights outlined, 
for example, in the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the free market rights specifically provided for in 
the written Treaties of the Community. The claims of 
individuals to be able to benefit from the free movement 
of workers, services, goods and capital appear to be put 
on the same level as the grandet claims of basic human 
rights such as the right to life, to respect, to freedom 
from torture, or to due judicial process.
If there is no distinction to be drawn between basic 
human rights and market rights then it is difficult to 
see any justification in the claim that the European 
Court will measure the specific enactments of Community 
law against some pre-eminent standard of respect for and 
protection of human rights. The invocation of the idea 
of human rights by the European Court does not set 




























































































executive action which has as its object the promotion of 
the four market freedoms is itself, in the vocabulary of 
the European Court, instantiating a fundamental right. 
A claim to violation of certain fundamental human rights 
hence ceases to be a "trump card" against executive 
action.
If human rights such as the right to property, to freedom 
of expression, et cetera, are placed on the same 
conceptual level as the economic freedoms, the freedom of 
movement of workers, goods, services and capital, we can 
no longer speak of a "validation" of a lower norm by a 
higher norm. What we have instead is the balancing 
against each other of two norms of equal qualitative 
significance. Such a procedure can be seen in the opinion 
of the Advocate General in S .P .U ■C . v . Grogan where he 
balances freedom of information, seen [63] as a corollary 
of the Community freedom to provide services against, 
ultimately, the right to life of the unborn child. The 
result of this equality in practical terms can only be 
that the Court will find it conceptually and logically 
easier to subordinate a fundamental human right to a 
Community economic freedom, as did Advocate-General Van 
Gerven in S.P.U.C v. Grogan.
Such a slippage from Community economic freedoms to 
fundamental human rights is, at best, contentious. It 
implies a positive stance on an issue which remains 




























































































relationship between different categories of rights.. 
For example, how are classic civil and political rights 
set out in the European Convention on Human Rights to be 
compared to claims to various economic, social and 
cultural rights set out in such documents as the European 
Social Charter and, it would now seem, the Treaty of 
Rome. The notion that, for example, the free movement 
of capital is a fundamental right in the international 
Community and not just in the European Community is by no 
means generally accepted. [64]
4.5. Talcing Rights Seriously - a summary
There is no consistency in the normative significance 
accorded by the European Court of Justice to fundamental 
human rights. As seen in the contrast between Wachauf 
and Ellanikl, there is a selective standard applied 
according to whether the legal rule at issue has its 
provenance in a Community institution, or rather was 
promulgated by a Member State.
Further, S.P.0,C.__ v . Grogan demonstrates that, on
occasion, the Court will effectively ignore fundamental 
rights issues and adopt a less than maximalist approach 
to rights protection where a Community economic freedom 
is at stake. The case is a clear repudiation of the 
views of Advocate General Warner in I.R.C.A.. S.P.U.C. 



























































































right in one Member State is insufficient to ensure its 
recognition and protection within the Community legal 
order.
Further, the case law we have cited indicates the 
tendency of the Court to confuse the question of the 
standing of fundamental rights in its normative hierarchy 
by designing Community freedoms as fundamental rights. 
Such an elevation can only be detrimental to the 
normative significance which has, hitherto, been accorded 
to fundamental human rights.
By using the term ’fundament a 1 right" in an instrumental 
way the Court refuses to take the discourse of
fundamental rights seriously. It thereby both devalues 
the notion of fundamental right and brings its own 
standing into disrepute.
5. CONCLUSION
The tactics and techniques of the European Court in using 
and applying human rights should now be clear from the 
line of cases we have examined. It would appear that 
the European Court initially adopted the terminology of 
fundamental rights in order to quell the revolt in the 
German Courts on the question of the adequate protection 
of human rights. It has thereby preserved the emergent 




























































































Wachauf, Elleniki and S.P.O.C. v . Grogan, illustrate the 
subsequent use of fundamental rights as a convenient 
procedural device for expanding the jurisdiction of the 
Court into areas of specifically national competence. 
Further, the Court is also seeking to use human rights 
principles, as expressed primarily in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as another level of review 
(and effective invalidation) of Member States' action, 
even where that action cannot be said to contravene the 
specific provisions of the E.C. Treaties. The Court has 
effectively declared in these cases that all questions 
concerning Community law have to be interpreted in the 
light of human rights considerations, as seen 
specifically in the text of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
These developments, consequent upon a plainly
instrumental approach to human rights concepts, have 
considerable practical implications for all the Member 
States of the Community, not least for the United Kingdom 
which has not yet unequivocally adopted the European 
Convention on Human Rights into its domestic law.
Given the jurisdictional expansion seen in t he
re formu lat ion of the Cin6th6que dictum in Elleniki and
S.P.O.C ., the Court now sees itself as be i ng able to
review national legis lation wherever this operat es in an
area touched by Community law. The Elleniki case holds 




























































































be made from a point of view of its respect for human 
rights. Similarly national Courts would now seem to be 
obliged to give effect to the European Convention on 
Human Rights as this would be interpreted by the European 
Court of Justice, if not the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, in all questions before them which 
fall within the field of Community law. [65] Article 
F(2) of the Common Provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
may encourage this trend.
In adopting and adapting the slogan of protection of 
human rights the Court has seized the moral high ground. 
It is difficult for national Courts to be seen to be 
objecting to their own duty to protect and enforce 
individual human rights.
Further, there would seem to be no reason to prevent the 
Court of Justice also assessing national legislation on 
the basis of other general principles of Community law, 
such as the doctrine of proportionality. The Court has 
consistently stated that "fundamental rights form an
integral part of the general principles of law,
observance of which it ensures." [66] In this way
would seem that where human rights have ventured, other 
general principles will follow and new, Community, 
doctrines of administrative law will thereby be imposed 




























































































In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, »x 
part» Brlnd and others [67] the House of Lords examined
the validity of the British Government's ban on the
broadcasting of the voices of members of certain
organisations notably Sinn Fein. Arguments were 
presented to the effect that the use of executive power 
in this regard was disproportionate to its proclaimed 
objective. These arguments were given short shrift.
Lord Lowry stated [68] that:
”[T)here is no authority for saying that 
proportionality in the sense in which the 
appellants have used it is part of English 
common law and a great deal of authority the 
other way. This, so far as I am concerned, is 
not a cause for regret..."
It is clear, following Wachauf (which was not cited to 
the Court), that had the Secretary of State's decision in 
Brlnd been taken in implementation of Community 
legislation the House of Lords would have been obliged to 
apply, inter alia, the doctrine of proportionality, as 
interpreted by the European Court of Justice would be 
held applicable even in the United Kingdom [69], This 
has already occurred in the various cases which have 
arisen out of challenges to the English Sunday trading 
laws on the basis of their alleged incompatibi1ity with 




























































































Further, the jurisdictional rule as formulated in
Ellenilci and S .P .0-C■ would suggest that the general 
principles of E.C. law should be applied by national 
Courts not simply where national authorities act in 
implementation of a Community rule but in fact when they 
act in any field touched by Community law. And it is 
clear that the fields where Community law can be said to 
have no influence are few and becoming fewer. It will 
become increasingly difficult for the British Courts to 
resist the application within domestic law of, not just 
proportionality but also the whole range of principles of 
administrative justice developed in and applied by the 
European Court of Justice. [71]
These developments in Community law might have been 
welcomed wholeheartedly if they had truly been effected 
by the European Court with the goal of extending the 
legal protection of the individual. However, from the 
outset it has been clear that human rights have been 
used, not with a view to protecting the individual, but 
with a view, rather, to protecting the status of the 
Court and of the Community legal order [72] . In
practice, the substance of individual rights is rarely, 
if ever, upheld as against Community objectives, whilst 
in theoretical terms their status has been devalued by 
the Court which treats human rights, and in particular 




























































































The Court seems willing to apply human rights as if they 
were superior to (and hence grounds for invalidating) the 
acts of Member States. However, at the same time, it 
clearly subordinates human rights to the end of closer 
economic integration in the Community. Evidently it is 
such integration, to be achieved through the acts of 
Community institutions, which the Court sees as its 
fundamental priority. The high rhetoric of human rights 
protection has become no more than a vehicle for the 
Court to achieve its own ends and to extend its own power 
and influence.
JASON COPPEL, B.A. (Oxon.)
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against the Community Institutions. The Court found the 
Commission liable for damages caused to Mr. Adams as a 
result of the Commission's failure to ensure that Adams' 
identity was kept confidential from his erstwhile 
employers, whom he had reported to the Commission for 
trading in a manner contrary to E.C. competition law. 
However, the case is quite unique in its facts and, in 
any event, was not decided on the basis of Mr. Adams' 
human or fundamental rights having been breached. 
Instead, the Court found that the servants of the 
Commission had a duty of confidentiality under article 
214 of the E.C. Treaty, and that breach of this duty 
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